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CAUSES OF MODERN UPHEAVALS IN THE ARAB WORLD

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Abstract. The article examines the causes of the "Arab Spring" and the factors influencing the escalation of the political crisis in Arab countries. As a result of the deep socio-political crisis in 2011-2013, a change of political regimes took place in some countries of North Africa and the Middle East. Despite the prerequisites for the destabilization of authoritarian regimes, their forced change has led to a crisis in some Arab States. The Middle East and North Africa took part in the forced revolutionary transformation of political regimes called the Arab Spring. The growth of protests in the region is due to internal and external reasons, and in each country they depend on the specific socio-political, economic, religious situation and the peculiarities of the historical development of states. The aftermath of these protests has led to destabilization in some countries in the Middle East. The purpose of this article is a comparative analysis of the main parameters of the Arab Spring revolution.

Keywords: North Africa and the Middle East, Arab Spring, socio-political crisis, democracy, political regime, Arab society.

Basic provisions

The relevance of the article is determined by the tensions in the Middle East and the growing political uncertainty in the region and in individual countries. The Arab world is the ethnic core of the Middle East. Mass protest movements that swept the region of the Middle East and North Africa in 2010–2011, affected a number of countries, and made an impression not only on the development of the entire region, but also on a global scale.

Since the beginning of 2011, some states in the Arab world have undergone changes through the forcing of political regimes. In connection with the revolutionary political transformations, the crisis in the countries, the threat of escalation, as well as the intervention of foreign states and international organizations have become more relevant when considering the parameters of the Arab Spring revolution. Therefore, the factors that led to instability require a comprehensive study of the transformation of political regimes in the Arab world. For this, it is necessary to conduct a comparative analysis of the political consequences of the Arab Spring process.

At the moment, states such as Egypt, Libya, Syria are experiencing the consequences of the riots that began in early 2011. A direct consequence of the "Arab Spring" in North Africa was the spread of its influence to other countries of the Greater Middle East, and the destabilization of the situation in a number of countries in the region.

Introduction

The events in the Middle East in 2011-2012, dubbed the "Arab Spring", came as a complete surprise to most domestic and foreign experts. The Arab Spring is a series of uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011-2012, which led to internal political, economic and social problems, as well as the influence of external factors in the Middle East, with the collapse of the ruling regime. and, in some cases, a civil war. A phenomenon that is still characterized by shaking in this area[1]. The revolutionary processes in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa were conditionally called the "Arab Spring". E.G. Ponomareva believes that the "Arab Spring" is an improved form of the West's struggle for geopolitical dominance [2]. Regarding the methods of instilling democracy, the revolutions of 2011-2013 demonstrated the ineffectiveness of elections in the Arab States. As a result of the overthrow of the former authoritarian regimes, there is no one to replace the old government, since the democratic forces are weak and split by internecine conflicts, and their public support is low. As a result, after the revolutions in the Arab countries, there was a systemic crisis. E. Stepanova, investigating the causes of the Arab revolutions, adheres to the opinion about the fundamental role of social discontent in the escalation of conflicts. Analyzing the situation in Egypt, the author points out a sharp gap, even by Middle Eastern standards, between the ordinary population and the managers, who are highly corrupt, belong to the pro-Western ruling political and economic elites and are well integrated into the world economy [3]. A well-known politician and orientalist E.M. Primakov regarded the phenomenon of the "Arab Spring" as a revolutionary wave that spontaneously struck the Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes in early 2011 [4]. For French political scientist and orientalist Francois Burg, the "Arab Spring" is a series of popular uprisings in the Arab world that began with the "Tunisian Spring" in January 2011 [5].

In the scientific community, the phenomenon of the "Arab Spring", with all the influence of an external factor, is perceived as a product of internal development. At the same time, some authors have suggested that these events were inspired by Western, primarily American circles, through non-governmental human rights organizations, PR structures, the Internet, and are analogs of color revolutions. It should be emphasized that most Middle Eastern experts and authors of publications on this problem support the paradigm of political realism, relying on the fact that nation-states, being a homogeneous substance, conduct a policy based on objective reasons based on their national interests. Authors such as Korotayev and Zinkina cite a fairly strong argument that the cause of the social explosion was the economic and demographic problems of the countries of the region [6]. Nayef Al-Shammari also explains the revolutions in the Middle East by internal political and ethnic problems and the struggle for power[7]. Denis Beauchard, adviser to the French Institute of International Relations on the Middle East, also writes about the internal causes of the social explosion, "for a long time Egypt had to confront social problems, economic development did not keep pace

with rapid demographic growth, and the situation when 40 percent of the population live on two dollars a day has become truly explosive"[8].

Description of materials and methods

Prerequisites of the political processes of the "Arab Spring"

North Africa, like the entire Middle East, is at the stage of catching up with industrial development. Egypt and Libya are forced to integrate into political transformations that have begun outside their borders and have caused a process of democratization around the world, which means a transition to market relations, a weakening of state participation in the economy and the formation of democratic institutions. The following components of modernization have become relevant for Egypt and Libya. Firstly, catching up with socio-economic development and overcoming backwardness that prevents innovative institutional changes. Secondly, the transformation of the social sphere: stimulating productive labor, increasing employment, providing the population with affordable education and healthcare. Thirdly, at the stage of transition from an agrarian form to an industrial one, developing countries had to solve the problem of limited own funds for large capital investments. Fourth, taking into account global trends in economics and politics, a choice has been made between a "closed" and an "open" development model. The "closed" model promotes stronger mobilization of internal resources and identifies external causes of the country's lag. The "open" model is more prone to borrowing, its transparency is supported by foreign investment.

Socio-economic development, overcoming backwardness and transformation of the social sphere in the republican period of Egypt and Libya occupy an important place, were implemented in different ways. The decisive factor here was not only following the chosen socio-economic strategy, but also solving the problem of limited own resources for modernization - the choice of a national development model. Egypt was more integrated into the processes of globalization, and Libya followed the path of regionalization.

In Egypt, the nationalism of the regime of G.A. Nasser was combined with the ideas of "Arab socialism". President A. Sadat built his political course, fully oriented to the West. H. Mubarak pursued a multi-vector policy, taking into account various centers of world influence. By the end of the twentieth century, the results of globalization in Egypt became noticeable. In the economic aspect, it is, first of all, market expansion based on competition caused by the policy of liberalization of foreign economic activity. An important role is played by the exchange of resources carried out through global supply chains, primarily through financial and information networks. In the political sphere, the number of political actors and the degree of their interdependence were increasing. Thus, the carriers of globalization are penetrating into the political space of Egypt: transnational corporations, transnational banks, the Internet community, various international coordinating organizations. In this sense, globalization reflects a qualitatively new stage of border permeability. Many researchers claim that by the end of the reign of H. Mubarak, Egypt was in a state of economic stagnation, poverty, inequality,

corruption and unemployment. As a result, the local private sector did not seek to invest in the national economy, reforms were complicated by a lack of finance, a shortage of qualified managerial personnel and a lack of technology[9].

Among the main problems that have engulfed Egyptian society, experts highlight the widening gap between rich and poor, the increased level of corruption and the lack of a competitive political system in which people can really fight for power. The main internal destabilizing factors that constitute the basis for destabilizing the situation were the food and demographic problem[10]. These two areas of threats to national security are closely related to each other. Providing the country with food is one of the priority issues in Egypt. Despite the fact that the minimum set of food products is subsidized by the state, there is a low dynamics of development of the agricultural sector in the country. In fact, today Egypt imports up to 60% of the necessary food. The dynamics of rising food prices caused a deterioration in the situation of low-income segments of the population, which in turn served as the basis for social instability.

The situation related to the provision of food is aggravated by the consequences of demographic problems. Every year the population in the country increases by 1.1-1.2 million people. According to scientists, 96-100 million people will live in Egypt in 2025, 115-120 million in 2065. The rapid increase in the number and reduction of mortality of the population places a heavy burden on the entire complex of economic, social and environmental problems. The peak of population growth occurred in 1985-1987. It follows from this that the largest number of young people aged 20 to 25 years falls on 2010-2011. The labor market is not able to absorb all graduates of schools and universities. The percentage of unemployed among graduates of secondary schools exceeded 31%, and universities -11.8%. This problem has been not only social, but also political for many years. It is young people who do not have reliable prospects of finding a worthy place in life, practically applying the knowledge they have received, who have become one of the main sources of replenishment of the ranks of radical Islamic organizations, including terrorist ones. A rapid increase in the proportion of young people can undermine existing political coalitions, generating instability. Large cohorts of young people are often attracted to new ideas or heterodox religions that challenge old forms of power. In addition, young people are relatively easily mobilized to participate in social or political conflicts [11]. In addition to the above, discontent was also caused by the current tough corrupt regime that has been ruling since 1981, the state of emergency imposed, and election fraud. The situation was aggravated by the preparation of H. Mubarak's son Gamal as a successor to the post of president.

As for Libya, the conditions of political destabilization were contradictory. The country was successfully developing economically, having the largest oil and gas reserves in Africa, which provided the Gaddafi regime with significant influence on the entire continent. For 20 years, the economy has been developing at a rapid pace. Therefore, Libya was an investor in other African states, provided up to 15% of the revenue of the budget of the African Union, covered the debts of other countries, providing them with loans for the purchase of its oil. Due to rapid

demographic growth (youth reaches 40-50% of the population of Libya), unemployment has increased [12]. Let's clarify that there were jobs in industry and agriculture, but they were no longer satisfied with the increased claims of young people. They were occupied by immigrants, mostly from Egypt, and, importantly, there were many Coptic Christians among them. Despite the serious social assistance of the state (cheap housing was built on a large scale, education and medical care were easily accessible), the indignation of young Libyans was growing. As in Egypt, the issues of bribery, police brutality, and information secrecy were painfully perceived, which intensified the desire to protest. Constant interactions between Egyptian and Libyan societies, their historical and cultural ties are important. However, having similar ethno-confessional and socio-cultural parameters and geopolitical determinants of development, Egypt and Libya differ in the long-term conditions of political processes. In some aspects they are opposite. In other aspects, the political strategies of Egypt and Libya had a partial contrast: different economic strategies were used in the two countries. The population of Egypt had an extremely low standard of living, and in Libya, before the overthrow of Gaddafi, an increased level of income was provided.

Results

The dominant political course of M. Gaddafi was "Islamic socialism" and direct democracy. "Islamic Socialism" was intended to unite the developing Arab countries and free them from the ideological expansion of both the West and the Soviet bloc. Direct democracy or "direct democracy", rejecting parliamentarism, assumed direct rule of the people through a system of people's committees and people's congresses. In 1977, the Libyan Arab Republic was renamed the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Jamahiriya in Arabic - the power of the people). However, the mode of M. Gaddafi, denying all forms of democracy existing in the modern world, dictated their policies to the "people's committees". The acquisition of legislative functions by the General People's Congress from the Revolutionary Command Council actually meant the transfer of legislative power under the control of M. Gaddafi. The reorganization of ministries into secretariats, the office of the chairman of the Council of Ministers - into the Supreme People's Committee transferred executive power to the personal jurisdiction of the Libyan leader. Gaddafi largely managed to achieve his goals. First of all, it concerned approaching the ideal of a socially homogeneous society by increasing the level of income per capita. The Libyan leader managed to implement his slogan: "Wealth in the hands of the people!". The difference between rich and poor strata has been reduced. The structure of the economy has been transformed – the population has received a personal interest in the final product, being its owner. The attitude to labor and production has been changed. The broad masses were attracted to participate in public administration for the first time. Being the poorest Arab country in the 1950s, Libya under the rule of M. Gaddafi achieved impressive economic progress, raising the standard of living of the population, strengthening

the public sector. In foreign policy, the Gaddafi regime was adamant: opposed the West, against Israel; supported the strengthening of Libyan nationalism and the unification of the Arab world around Libya. Anti-imperialist policies were carried out, which led to isolation and clashes with Western countries.

For a long time, the doctrine of Arab unity prevailed in the ideological sphere, uniting the countries of North Africa and the Middle East on a secular-ethnic basis, contributing to the development of people's liberation, anti-imperialist movements. But this doctrine has experienced a deep crisis since the early 1970s, both due to internal reasons and the opposition of Western countries. In Egypt and Libya, two main ideological trends were constantly competing – secular nationalism, inspired by Western political thought, and "Muslim nationalism", based on Islam as a symbol of resistance to the West¹. The long colonial rule of the West led to the fact that the role of Islam in the countries of North Africa was significantly limited. After gaining independence, Islam became a source of State identity, ideology and values. In the last third of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the XXI century. The influence of Islam in the political process of the studied states has steadily grown. Islam in various ideological and political interpretations has become an integral part of the political course of the ruling elites. The Islamic factor in the political processes of Arab countries is studied by many experts. Islam has an influence on political institutions, political actors and the socio-cultural sphere in Arab countries [13].

As for Libya's foreign policy, when Muammar Gaddafi came to power in 1969, he took an anti-Western position. Immediately after the coup, in October, 1969, the Permanent Representative of Tripoli at the 24th session of the UN General Assembly made a statement about Libya's desire to cease the existence of all Western military bases on its land. London and Washington were informed of the termination of all relevant agreements. Naturally, neither the US nor the UK were very dissatisfied with the policy of the new head of state. Already in 1970, all banks were nationalized, in 1973 Libya, along with Algeria and Iraq, established its control over oil production, as a result, the entire oil industry was nationalized. Libya's relations with France were not easy either. Since gaining independence in 1951, Libya has consistently stood in the way of France's interests in North Africa. After Muammar Gaddafi came to power, the confrontation only escalated. Libyan troops fought with Chad, extremists from Morocco and Algeria were armed and trained with Libyan money. The confrontation reached its climax on September 19, 1989, when Libyans blew up a French airline UTA with 170 passengers on board in the sky over Niger. As a result, in April 1992, the UN Security Council, at the request of the United States and Great Britain, imposed international sanctions against Libya. International sanctions had a negative impact on the economic situation in the country, a number of social projects were curtailed. Only in 2003, after the American occupation of Iraq, Muammar Gaddafi changed his policy, recognized the fact of terrorism. He announced the rejection of the development of weapons of mass destruction, admitted international experts to the country and expressed a desire to settle the issue of compensation for victims of terrorist

attacks, despite the declared "non-involvement" of Libya in them. In October 2004, Libya was completely freed from international sanctions.

Discussions

As for Syria, it should be noted that the discontent in Syria, which resulted in a full-scale confrontation and civil war, were caused by unresolved social problems and were of a religious and ethno-national nature. Thus, the main problem was the principle of the distribution of positions in the state apparatus in accordance with religious affiliation (Sunnis, who make up the majority of the country's population, had limited rights to fill positions in public authorities, unlike Alawites (the religious direction of Shiites), on which the former president of the republic Hafez al-Assad relied, as well as the Kurdish problem. The protesters' demands were reduced to the abolition of the state of emergency (introduced back in 1963), the liquidation of secret prisons, the resignation of provincial governors, and the conduct of trials of those responsible for the deaths of civilians. Nevertheless, B. Assad proved himself to be a flexible politician, in particular, a week after the beginning of the speeches, the Assad government promised the Syrians to lift the state of emergency (the decree on cancellation was signed on April 20, 2011), censorship, allow opposition political parties, reform the judicial system, create conditions for free elections. In addition, on February 26, a referendum was held in Syria on the draft of a new constitution, the main innovation of which was the abolition of the leadership role of the Baath Party and the equality of all political parties was established. These decisions have become unprecedented for the entire Middle East region, and if the plan had been implemented in full and in a timely manner, Syria might have managed to avoid a revolution and turn into a democratic state. One of the indirect causes of popular discontent, according to some Western experts, was also an unprecedented drought that affected more than half of the Syrian lands in the period from 2006 to 2011 due to mismanagement and irrational use of land resources by the government. According to the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in 2009 about 800 thousand people in Syria lost their livelihood, in 2010 their number was already 1 million people. These reasons led to a mass exodus of the country's rural population to the cities. In particular, more than 200 thousand people moved to the city of Aleppo alone (the second most economically important city in the country) during this period, while it should also take into account the large number of Iraqi refugees who flooded the country after the US-Iraq war in 2003, which in turn contributed to the armed conflict [14]. Key attention during the formation of foreign policy in Syria was paid to relations with Israel, Turkey and Iran, as well as Russia. Under President Bashar al-Assad, Iran's role in the region has increased markedly, which, according to a number of monarchs of the Persian Gulf and the leaders of a number of other Arab countries where Sunnis are in power, poses a threat to the formation of the so-called "Shiite arc" or "Shiite crescent". As for military cooperation, one of the key stages here was the signing in 2006 by Iranian Defense Minister M. Najjar and his Syrian counterpart H. Turkamni defense agreements. In 2011 Iran is providing \$23 million in aid to Syria for the

construction of a military base in Latakia. After the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, Iran continued to provide not only political support to the official authorities of Syria, but also financial, diplomatic and military assistance in the form of arms supplies and the provision of elite detachments of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to protect the country's leadership.

Under Bashar al-Assad, the main enemies of Syria were still Israel and the United States. After the Iraq War in 2003, Washington intensified accusations against Damascus of interfering in the Iraqi conflict and supporting regional terrorist groups² European countries, Israel and the United States accused Damascus of sponsoring terrorist groups Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. At the same time, despite the open support of these Islamic organizations, Bashar did not deny the possibility of a peaceful dialogue with Israel. Despite such statements, in 2002 the United States included Syria in the "axis of evil". And in 2004. The United States has imposed economic sanctions against Syria. Today, Western countries are actively providing assistance to the Syrian opposition, constantly strengthening economic sanctions, applying a set of political, diplomatic, financial and economic measures, as well as forms of information and propaganda pressure on the government of the republic. The external opposition to Damascus in the Middle East is openly led by the Saudi royal family and the Emir of Qatar, while they have received the support of most Arab countries, they are supported by Lebanese liberal circles, Turkey, the United States and EU countries. From the very beginning of his rule, Bashar al-Assad failed to build constructive partnerships with Western countries.

Conclusion

Summing up the analysis of the internal policy of B. It can be concluded that Assad's reforms were not consistent, and some initiatives were subsequently revised. The changes carried out by the President (the abolition of the state of emergency, the adoption of a new constitution that abolished the leading role of the Baath Party in the country, etc.) were carried out belatedly and did not lead to stabilization of the situation in the SAR [15]. The general weakness, the "clumsiness" of the authoritarian regime's construction, the alienation between the authorities and the people, the inability of the authorities to consolidate their supporters also affected. As a result, Syria plunged into a civil war, which took partly the form of an inter-confessional confrontation between Sunnis and Alawites. Moreover, radical Islamist groups, represented mainly by foreign Sunni militants, began to gain more and more weight in the ranks of the Syrian armed opposition.

In foreign policy, B. Assad gave priority to the development of bilateral relations with Iran and Russia. The President also sought to maintain partnership relations with Turkey, but Turkey itself, after the start of the uprising in Syria, revised its position and supported the opposition. During his presidency, Bashar al-Assad failed to build constructive relations with Israel and the United States. At the

same time, the US policy towards Syria is characterized by rigidity and a clear desire to overthrow the ruling regime.

Thus, the events of the "Arab Spring" had a significant impact on the shifts in the balance of power in the Middle East. This is due to changes in political regimes, the strengthening of terrorist organizations and the emergence of new conflicts in the region, such as the civil war in Syria and Yemen.

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АРАБ ӘЛЕМІНДЕГІ ҚАЗІРГІ ТӨҢКЕРІСТЕРДІҢ СЕБЕПТЕРІ

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Аңдатпа. Мақалада «Араб көктемінің» алғышарттары және араб елдеріндегі саяси дағдарыстың ушығуына әсер ететін факторлар қарастырылады. 2011-2013 жылдардағы терең әлеуметтік-саяси дағдарыстың нәтижесінде Солтүстік Африка мен Таяу Шығыстың кейбір елдерінде саяси режимдердің өзгеруі орын алды. Авторитарлық режимдердің тұрақсыздануының алғышарттарына қарамастан, олардың мәжбүрлі өзгеруі кейбір араб мемлекеттерінде дағдарысқа әкелді. Таяу Шығыс пен Солтүстік Африка Араб көктемі деп аталатын саяси режимдердің мәжбүрлі революциялық өзгеруіне қатысты. Аймақтағы наразылықтардың өсуі ішкі және сыртқы себептерге және әр елде олар нақты әлеуметтік-

саяси, экономикалық, діни жағдайға және мемлекеттердің тарихи даму ерекшеліктеріне байланысты болды. Бұл наразылықтардың салдары Таяу Шығыстың кейбір елдерінде тұрақсыздыққа әкелді. Мақаланың мақсаты - араб көктемі революциясының негізгі параметрлерін салыстырмалы талдау.

Түйін сөздер: Солтүстік Африка және Таяу Шығыс, Араб көктемі, әлеуметтік-саяси дағдарыс, демократия, саяси режим, араб қоғамы.

ПРИЧИНЫ СОВРЕМЕННЫХ ПЕРЕВОРОТОВ В АРАБСКОМ МИРЕ

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Аннотация. В статье рассматриваются причины «арабской весны», и факторы, влияющие на эскалацию политического кризиса в арабских странах. В результате глубокого социально-политического кризиса в 2011–2013 годах в некоторых странах Северной Африки и Ближнего Востока произошла смена политических режимов. Несмотря на предпосылки дестабилизации авторитарных режимов, их вынужденная смена привела к кризису в некоторых арабских государствах. Ближний Восток и Северная Африка приняли участие в вынужденной революционной трансформации политических режимов, называемой арабской весной. Рост протестов в регионе обусловлен внутренними и внешними причинами, и в каждой стране они зависят от конкретной социально-политической, экономической, религиозной ситуации и особенностей исторического развития государств. Последствия этих протестов привели к дестабилизации в некоторых странах Ближнего Востока. Целью данной статьи является сравнительный анализ основных параметров революции арабской весны.

Ключевые слова: Северная Африка и Ближний Восток, арабская весна, социально-политический кризис, демократия, политический режим, арабское общество.